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A country’s degree of democratic development is the best predictor of economic 
prosperity. African nations are some of the poorest on the planet and tend to have low levels of 
democracy, while wealthier nations tend toward higher levels. If Africa is going to increase its 
economic output, theory suggests one of the best ways to accomplish such a goal is to increase 
African democracy levels. Why do some countries in Africa develop democracy while others do 
not? I analyze the Freedom House and Polity IV democracy scores for each country in order to 
determine which countries are the most democratic and compare them with historical and 
demographic data, such as political instability events, fragmentation, population, GDP, and 
colonial history, in order to give a more robust picture of what factors matter most in the 
development of democracy in Africa. I also analyze data on countries outside of Africa in order 
to determine whether or not Africa has different prerequisites for democracy than the rest of the 
world. I theorize literacy rates, urbanization, and elimination of fragmentation may be more 
important than economic factors in the development of democracy in Africa.
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Introduction
Which country, since independence, has had one of the fastest growing Gross Domestic 
Products in the world, experienced continuous democratic rule, had free and fair elections, 
responsive state institutions with low corruption levels, and levels of human development 
ranking among the highest in the world? The island nation of Mauritius has all of these qualities 
and more. A bastion of democracy, Mauritius has been a shining example of development since 
gaining independence in 1968. Although one of the most successful, Mauritius is not the only 
African country to boast such accomplishments. Other nations like Cape Verde and Sao Tome 
and Principe have experienced similar tracks toward freedom and prosperity. Others, such as The
Gambia and Gabon have not been able to transition toward true freedom, despite sharing certain 
characteristics with Mauritius. Why have some states in Africa been able to establish successful 
democratic governance, while such a feat has escaped the majority of African countries for 
decades? I examine this question by analyzing how political instability, fragmentation, economic
measures, modernization and colonization influence the development of democracy in both 
Africa and the rest of the world.
The continent of Africa is home to only a few true democratic regimes.  Most are either 
democratic in name only, or are unquestionably authoritarian.  Freedom House, an independent 
organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy in the world, currently 
classifies forty percent of the world as “Free countries,” with twenty-four percent being partially 
free, and thirty-six percent “Not Free” (Freedom House, 2015). In Africa, the numbers are even 
worse. Only ten countries out of fifty-three are classified as “Free,” a rate of only nineteen 
percent. In order to receive “Partly Free” or “Not Free” ratings, countries may experience limited
free or fair elections, choice of political parties, little to no minority representation, high levels of
political corruption, very few civil rights, civil war and limited or non-existent freedom of the 
1
press. Without access to these, a country cannot rightly be classified as a democracy, and may be
only considered to be “partly free.” Very few of the countries in Africa can boast access to such 
rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) grants civil liberties to everyone in 
the world. According to the declaration, democracy is the best avenue available to ensure access 
to civil rights (United Nations, 2016) . Democratic values are universal because of the intrinsic 
value of political participation, the way democracy keeps governments accountable through 
political incentives, and the way democracy helps citizens understand their needs, rights and 
duties (Sen, 1999). Overwhelmingly, citizens of the world prefer democracy to any other system 
of government (Shin, 2012). If Africa were to be fully democratic, millions of people would 
finally gain access to the political and civil liberties granted by the UDHR. In order for access to 
happen, we must first understand what factors are the most influential in transitions to 
democracy.
Democracy’s ability to bring equality to disparate groups of people is one of its strongest 
features. The people of Mauritius found a novel way to equalize representation: 
consociationalism (Srebrenik, 2012), an idea guaranteeing minority groups have representation 
in the government. Mauritius has twenty three-seat constituencies, half in rural areas populated 
by the Hindu, who make up a little over half of the ethnicity of the island, and half in the urban 
areas, where everyone else lives. Prior to the election, each candidate must register as a member 
of one of the four officially recognized ethnicities: Hindu, Muslim, Sino-Mauritian, or General 
Population. The three candidates in each constituency with the highest vote totals are elected, 
with up to eight seats awarded to the party whose candidates lost their elections. Following the 
election, any ethnic group with a representation level below the actual percentage of population 
level is awarded seats to correct the imbalance. Consociationalism assures each group has 
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representation equal to its constituency. The many ethnic groups in Africa may attain equal voice
in a democracy through consociationalism.
Democracy also enables beneficial economic reform. Many countries rely on foreign aid 
because of an inability to legitimately collect taxes. A state relying too much on international aid 
is less accountable to its citizens because the state does not depend on tax revenue (Moss, 2006). 
For instance, both Mauritania and Rwanda have an incredibly high percentage of government 
revenue coming from overseas development aid, at eighty-seven and ninety-nine percent, 
respectively (Bräutigam, 2004). Mauritania and Rwanda are freer to act without any regard 
toward the will of the people. Each state is less willing to invest in beneficial programs or 
institutions benefiting the people. By instituting democratic economic reforms, states will lessen 
corruption caused by an over-reliance on foreign aid through the legitimate collection of taxes. 
Additionally, economic reforms can provide transparence, ensuring confident, legitimate 
investment into the needful but resource-rich environments of Africa.
Democracy provides accountability for elected officials and the court systems through 
free and fair elections. In order for a government to be taken seriously by the governed, there can
be no doubt the government is providing citizens access to basic civil rights. Accountability 
works to check the power of governments by removing from the decision-making process 
corrupt or incompetent officials. By establishing a clear record of votes and economic 
transactions, governments encourage public participation in the democratic process. 
Governments lacking accountability engender apathy in a citizenry struggling with the 
fundamental question of what difference each citizen can make. When African countries enable 
democratic reforms, citizens will be gaining access to true freedom.
Much of the current literature focuses on how economic development impacts whether or
not a country is democratic. Some scholars theorize a country’s prospering economy and thriving
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citizenry will demand freedom. Seymour Lipset posits development and modernization work 
hand-in-hand to increase incomes and, therefore, social change (Lipset, 1959). A more modern 
theory holds the relationship between income and the development of democratic institutions is 
non-linear (Dervis, 2006). Even though determining causality in whether good economies 
develop democracies or democracies develop good economies may be impossible, a positive 
correlation exists between the two (Acemoglu, 2009). Because of the abundance of theories 
relating economics to the development of democracy, economic measure were included in my 
analysis. If economics turn out to be insignificant factors, something more institutional in nature 
may be more important.
Democratic development may be dependent upon balancing the power of different 
classes with each other and with the government. Demographic changes, such as the size of the 
middle and working class, and also whether or not the government works to protect the rights of 
these classes, reflect power balance. A growing middle class reflects a positive change in power 
balance, as the number of poorer citizens decreases without a corresponding increase in wealth 
transfer to the elites. One way to protect the rights of the non-elites is to grant property rights to 
individuals, which enables capitalist development (Roxas, 2011). Property rights make political 
exclusion of the middle and working classes difficult for governments (Huber, 1993). Property 
rights make stakeholders out of individuals, which may increase the development of democracy. 
Other theories on democratic development focus on geography and demographics. There 
is an apparent correlation between size and democratization. The smaller a country’s population, 
the more likely the government is to be democratic (Dahl, 1973). Other arguments say 
population is not the determining factor, but total geographic area is the most important (Anckar,
2008). Narrowing the focus,  Anckar found islands are the most likely to be democratic, possibly
due to both geographical area and population (Anckar, 2006). If demographic factors are the 
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most important, the outlook for democratic development is dim, due to demographic factors 
largely lying beyond the control of governments and populations. 
I examine the process by which countries in Africa develop democracy via mixed method
quantitative analysis and qualitative case study.  I evaluate the evolution of democracy in three 
main ways. The first way is by looking at  “big picture” puzzles, such as why structures or 
patterns happened in one place, but not another. Second, my analytical perspective takes 
temporal arguments into account. When looking at why institutions did or did not develop in 
certain places, one must account for historical differences -- in the particular case of Africa, the 
colonial heritage of different European powers and each power’s effect on developing the habits 
and physical institutional structures central to democratic development. Finally, my approach 
looks at the context of each factor. I weigh the relative importance of each against external 
factors, rather than simply identifying one cause and applying it in all cases regardless of 
circumstance. This approach uses broad and multi-factored analysis, and so makes an ideal way 
through which one may analyze the problem of African democratic development. As the goal of 
my paper is to examine multiple factors contributing to African democratic development, mixed 
method analysis allows me to look at the big picture patterns of development, both in Africa and 
the rest of the world, with not just descriptive analysis, but also prescriptive solutions for current 
African non-democracies.
What is the primary reason some countries in Africa have developed democracy while 
others have not? Are these reasons different for Africa than for other countries of the world? To 
find out, I ran a regression analysis for the Freedom House and Polity IV measures of democracy
against several variables: Years a country experienced political instability, number of political 
instability events, French and British colonial history, population, landlocked status, GDP per 
capita, GINI, degree of urbanization, ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation, and adult 
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literacy rate. I then compared the results of the regression analysis with the real-world results 
from the African nations of Mauritius and Gabon. My results indicate Africa’s needs for 
democracy are different from the rest of the world. But, the analysis of my case studies shows 
numbers may not tell the whole story, as the case of Mauritius illustrates. In most countries, 
events that cause political instability contribute negatively toward the development of 
democracy. However, Africa appears to be different. Economic, literacy and colonization 
variables may not contribute as much to democracy as current literature suggests. My research 
indicates urbanization and income inequality do remain significant factors for non-African 
countries. These results show significant changes must be made in the attitudes of developed 
countries toward Africa in regard to the development of democracy on the continent.
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Literature Review
Theories on Democratic Development
There have been many theories on how countries begin the process of democratization 
and maintain democracy. The most influential theory is modernization, which postulates 
societies are more likely to be democratic as countries grow more prosperous and develop civic 
institutions. Income inequality, measured by GINI, may also play a role in democratization. 
Research shows colonial history and geography may also be significant predictors of democratic 
robustness. If a country was democratic in the past, it is more likely to develop or retain 
democracy. Regional differences also matter. Countries in regions where democracy is present 
tend toward democracy, while countries in “bad neighborhoods” tend not to be. Literacy rates, 
ethnic fragmentation and political instability events may also be significant factors in whether or 
not countries transition to democracy. There has not been a sufficient amount of research linking 
the previously outlined causal factors together to in order to determine which are the most 
influential. I will provide an overview of each factor showing why each was chosen for inclusion
in my analysis.
I. Political Instability Events
Political instability events can take many forms, from military coups to civil wars to 
authoritarian reversals. Their role in destabilizing the infrastructure and institutions of democracy
in African countries cannot be overstated. Political instability events are numerous and effective 
due to the relative ease of exploiting existing internal conflict. Internal conflict creates pockets of
non-democratic politics, which is easier than trying to impose external power upon a society 
(Nyong’o, 1988). Both political stability and instability tend to be self-reinforcing (Feng, 1997).  
Democracies tend to engage in fewer military disputes across nations because of the way 
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disputes tend to create an unstable chain of events (Maoz and Russet, 1992). Thus, a country 
wishing to transition to democracy must stop unstable events. 
Democracy is also positively correlated with major regular government change (change 
governed by law and order) and reduces the probability of irregular government change (Feng, 
1997). Feng found the probability of a coup d’etat was lower when the rate of economic growth 
was high (1997). High economic growth was positively correlated with a stable democratic 
political system (1997). Interestingly, many democratic transitions occur in middle-income 
countries (per capita $2,346 - $5,000 US 1980), as traditional autocratic regimes find it difficult 
to maintain their power amidst an increasingly complex society (Haggard, 1995). There is, 
however, a problem confounding democracy with stability because democracy can be measured 
on a continuum rather than an either-or (Bollen and Jackman, 1989). The role of political 
instability events in undermining democratic development appears to be important, but its 
relative significance in African countries and non-African countries is unknown. Political 
instability events may merely be a symptom of dysfunction elsewhere in the African political 
system.
Hypothesis 1: High levels of political instability will be significantly correlated with low
levels of democracy.
II. Modernization Theory
Modernization theory posits as a country’s economy prospers and grows richer, citizens 
will begin to demand freedom in the form of democracy. Belonging to Seymour Lipset, 
modernization theory is perhaps the most often-cited theory on the development of democracy 
(Lipset, 1959).  In Lipset’s theory, development and modernization work to increase incomes by 
providing a healthy environment in which economies may prosper. Positive economic outcomes, 
in turn, cause social change. Modernization theory can be supported in part with current data 
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from the World Bank showing countries rated highest in democratic freedom (Freedom House, 
2016) have, in general, higher GDP per capita than countries classified as “Not Free” (World 
Bank, 2016). As incomes increase from $1,000 toward $5,001-$6,000 PPP, countries are more 
likely to be democracies (Prezeworksi, 1995). World Bank data shows a correlation between 
economic development and democracy. But not all data supports Lipset’s conclusion.
IIA. Socioeconomic Modernization
More recent theory holds the relationship between income and the development of 
democratic institutions is neither simple nor linear, in contrast to early modernization theory. 
Neither extreme poverty and underdevelopment nor more extensive economic prosperity provide
fertile ground for blooming democracy. Countries with incomes below $1,000 PPP and countries
above $6,000 PPP are more likely to be authoritarian regimes (Przeworski, 1997). This creates a 
“bell-shaped pattern of instability,” with democracy prevalent in the middle, flanked by 
authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1968). Additionally, there is not a significant difference in 
economic growth between democratic and authoritarian regimes (Dervis, 2006). In one study, 
democracy was, indeed, positively correlated with economic growth, but the effect was 
statistically insignificant (Feng, 1997). Statistical insignificance means conclusions drawn about 
the effect of economic growth on democracy are tenuous, at best, and not supported in full by 
data. Because there are poor countries who have developed relatively high levels of democratic 
institutions and many countries with relatively high levels of per capita income lagging far 
behind in measures of democracy, one cannot assume a linear progression model will lead any 
country toward democracy via an established path. 
On the other hand, there is evidence supporting the position economic development has a 
positive correlation with democratic transition. In some studies, there is not only correlation, but 
causation, as well. Democratic development increases income equality and decreases the amount 
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of money the rich would lose to an autocratic regime (Boix and Stokes, 2003). Democracy 
outpaces dictatorships in economic growth at all income levels save for the lowest (Milanovic, 
2005).  Higher levels of per capita income consolidate existing democracies and promote 
transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes (Epstein, et. al, 2006; Rueschemeyer, 1992).
“Strong evidence supports the argument that economic development increases the likelihood of 
democratic politics (Geddes, 1999).” These studies show a direct relationship between economic 
growth and democracy, in contrast to the previously outlined studies. The differing outcomes 
show democratic development remains far more nuanced and complex.
One such nuance is the effect class power has upon democracy. Some theories suggest 
the equalization of class power, or at least the lessening of a large discrepancy in power between 
the classes, is a key factor for democracies. The first reason is a sufficient class balance does not 
allow one group to be powerful enough to singularly dominate the state (Bardhan, 1993). 
Traditionally, the landed upper classes were the biggest opponents of democracy (Huber, et. al., 
1993). Second, equalization of class power positively impacts the outcomes of bargaining 
between employers and unions or the working class (Huber, et. al., 1997), providing them with 
more power relative to the upper class. Class balance is a central factor in the ability for lower 
classes to affect policy, and may also contribute to a rebalancing of income inequality, which 
will be discussed shortly.
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of GDP will be significantly correlated with higher levels of 
democracy.
IIB. Cultural Modernization
The second facet of Lipset’s modernization theory concerns what impact institutions and 
cultural indoctrination have on democracy (1959). Institutions and culture work together to 
increase the legitimacy of democratic institutions by providing structure and accountability to 
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governments. Workers’ organizations, trade unions and political parties are some of the 
institutions playing a major role in extending democracy (Lipset, 1959). For instance, legitimacy 
allowed Norwegian democracy to remain stable, even when the economy was not very 
prosperous (Eckstein, 1966). Institutions have been historically underdeveloped in Africa, 
especially post-independence, when the rise of single-party systems remained unresponsive to 
the demands of varied ethnic groups (Brautigam, 2004). However, as Arat found, democracy and
the development of social structures do not necessarily increase together in lock-step (Arat, 
1988). Because of the conflicting nature of the findings of various scholars, more research is 
needed in this area.
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of urbanization will be correlated with greater scores for 
democracy.
III. Inequality Theory
Several scholars have identified low levels of income inequality as a key determinant of 
democratic development. But how, exactly, income equality exerts influence on democracy is 
not entirely clear. Economic equality has been shown to both increase the probability of 
democratic transition and stability of the regimes (Boix, 2003). High levels of income inequality 
are correlated with declines in levels of democracy (Acemoglu, 2001; Muller, 1995). Similarly, 
high levels of democratic participation are correlated with lower levels of income inequality 
(Mueller, 2002, Li, 2003). However, income equality comes with a corresponding cost. High 
participation is also correlated with larger government entities, leading to a slowing of economic 
growth (Mueller, 2002). In fact, most of the time, income inequality is positively associated with 
economic growth (Li, 1998). Positive association between income inequality and economic 
growth is in conflict with Lipset’s theory of economic development, where he posits economic 
growth among all classes is a key driver of democracy. There is room in Lipset’s theory for 
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income inequality, for it does not specify that income growth must be the same across classes. 
But, more refinement to the theory is needed.
Hypothesis 4: Lower levels of inequality will be correlated with higher levels of 
democracy.
III. Country Size
Size does appear to play a role in the development of democracy of states, but how big 
that role is is up for debate. In this case, size does not refer just to geographical size, but also to 
population density. Geographical size is negatively correlated with democracy. Small, insular 
nations are most strongly connected to democratic development (Anckar, 1995). Specifically, 
small island states are more likely to be democratic, regardless of level of economic development
(Srebrnik, 2004). Total geographical area may also be an important variable, not just whether or 
not the country is an island (Anckar, 2008). Larger population size encourages democracy 
through a more developed political infrastructure and a greater dispersal of power (Gerring, 
2011). Anckar theorizes the homogeneity of small, insular societies contributes more to 
democracy than absolute size (2002). Homogeneity contradicts the idea of size as the 
determining factor.  Although size arguments are usually applied to micro-states and island 
nations, they do have implications for larger states, as geographical size and homogeneity are 
largely beyond the control of governments.
Hypothesis 5: Population will be positively correlated with scores for democracy.
IV. Fragmentation
There are over 50 countries in Africa, and an even greater number of individual ethnic 
groupings. Virtually none of these countries’ borders were drawn with any respect to differing 
ethnicities, resulting in high ethnic fragmentation among African countries. Some theorize ethnic
fragmentation has a negative effect on democracy. For instance, in the United States, ethnic 
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fragmentation is negatively correlated with the provision of public goods and infrastructure 
(Alesina, 1997). Easterly and Levine found high ethnic fragmentation explains insufficient 
infrastructure, high government deficits and political instability (1997). High ethnic 
fragmentation can help democracy if no single group has all the power (Reilly, 2000). When the 
different ethnic groups are not strong enough to individually propel a candidate to office, there is
a resulting need for differing groups to collaborate and compromise on nominating candidates 
with a broader appeal (Mozaffar, 2003). But, the effects of power sharing between ethnic groups 
is unclear, having failed in places like Rwanda and Angola, and been successful in South Africa 
and Somaliland (Alesina, 2004). That linguistic diversity has a greater stabilization effect on new
democracies than racial or religious fragmentation could be of special importance in a place like 
Africa, where linguistic diversity is high (Birnir, 2007). Additionally, some scholars have shown 
ethnic diversity not contribute to insurgency or civil war (Fearon, 2003). The effect of all forms 
of fragmentation on democracy is unclear. My research seeks to provide a measure of the impact 
fragmentation has on democratic development.
Hypothesis 6: Higher levels of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation will be correlated with
lower levels of democracy.
Hypothesis 7: Higher levels of religious fragmentation will be correlated with lower 
levels of democracy.
V. Literacy
Though new forms of media change the way we learn and interact with political systems, 
a basic literacy is needed in order to understand how democracy functions and how democracy 
can benefit the individual. Understanding the issues facing emerging democracies cannot be truly
accomplished without literacy and education. Literacy enables a form of citizenship in which 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups have the opportunity to shape their lives in ways that 
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benefit them, instead of being the subject of oppression by ruling elites (Giroux, 1992). Healthy 
democracy requires extended learning and deliberation, and one place this type of learning exists
is in the classroom. Traditional classroom-based civic education can, and does, increase political 
knowledge (Galston, 2001). The process of debate and deliberation helps citizens see the benefit 
of democracy and make it relevant in their own lives (Jacobs, 2009). Technology has always 
both facilitated and been an impediment to democracy, hindering the illiterates’ understanding of
the issues when print was the only medium through which information was readily disseminated 
and helping the illiterate when new forms of communication independent of literacy, such as 
direct voice communication, arose (Williams, 2009). The emerging citizenry needs to be literate 
in all forms of new media in order to be an engaged and active participatory democracy 
(Mihailidis, 2013). Citizens’ literacy increases knowledge of the issues, allowing them to make 
informed decisions about the future. Informed citizens may be a significant factor in the 
development of democracy.
Hypothesis 8: Higher rates of adult literacy will be significantly correlated with higher 
levels of democracy.
VI. The Legacy of Colonialism
Colonialism, the practice of acquiring control over another country, is one of the non-
economic factors current literature identifies as a significant predictor of democratic 
development. Scholars posit colonial heritage plays a large part in the eventual development of 
democracy. If an occupying colonial power was democratic, it may have left behind behaviors or
institutions the citizens assimilated into current democracies (Anckar, 2002; Clague, et. al, 2001; 
Bernhard 2004). Democracy is a process of accommodation, requiring different parties to 
voluntarily divide and coalesce. Parties must agree a singular vision is not always possible 
(Rustow, 1970). Attitudes toward democracy and democratic ideals are not easily changed. By 
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providing structural authorities in society, such as family, church, business and trade unions, 
democracy may be normalized into a culture (Eckstein, 1997).  Normalization shows people how
democracy works, rather than simply telling citizens it does and expecting people to choose 
democracy without proof of efficacy. But, normalization only shows how colonialism influences 
democracy. The question of whether or not colonialism is a significant factor in democratic 
development remains unanswered.
There have been quite a number of studies examining the impact of colonial history on 
modern day countries. Studies have examined the issue in a number of different ways, mostly 
examining the impacts of past colonialism on current economies. Colonialism contributes to 
current-day income inequality, a factor linked with democracy, when European settlers are the 
minority group in a country (Angeles, 2006). However, the effect of colonialism on economic 
growth is insignificant (Milanovic, 2005). Furthermore, countries with colonial histories 
experienced high levels of external extraction (whether through the slave trade or natural 
resources) and still suffer the effects of extraction today. Extraction causes former colonies to 
exhibit low levels of development (Nunn, 2007). A few studies show colonial heritage is 
positively associated with democratic survival; British colonial heritage, specifically, is more 
influential in democratic development than other colonials powers (Bernhard, et. al, 2004; 
Lange, 2004; Clague, 2001; Olsson, 2009). However, if colonial rule was initiated during the 
Imperial era (around 1850), there was not enough time for the colonies to be fully indoctrinated 
with democratic ideals, and so these countries still have relatively low levels of democracy 
(Olsson, 2009). African countries may have been colonized too recently for colonialism to have 
made any significant impact on current-day democratic status.
Hypothesis 9: British colonial history will be positively correlated with democracy, 
while French colonial history will have a negative correlation.
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Summary
Current literature identifies many factors with influence over democratic development. 
However, no single factor has emerged through literature as being the most influential. Most 
importantly, these variables have not been evaluated against one another in order to determine 
which are the most important. The goal of my research is to weigh the available theories against 
one another through statistical analysis. My method will show how competing arguments may be
numerically compared and evaluated.
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Methods
The goal of my research is to determine the factors contributing the most toward 
democratic development in Africa. In order to do this, I chose to compare regression analyses on 
all the countries in Africa to regression analyses on all the countries of the world. The first 
analysis determined the factors most important to democracy in current-day Africa. The second 
analysis sought to determine if the factors for Africa are different than the factors important to 
non-African countries. Each variable is an analogue for a specific theory on democratic 
transition. I expected to find economic prosperity is the most influential factor in democratic 
development, as the bulk of research has previously identified economic outcomes as being the 
most important.
Key variables
My dependent variables were direct and indirect measures of democracy. Two ranking 
systems stood out as the most widely recognized and thorough: Freedom House and Polity IV. 
Though Freedom House does not directly measure democracy, Freedom House scores correlate 
with Polity IV’s more direct measure of democracy. Freedom House has three broad 
classification categories, Not Free, Partly Free and Free. A value of “1” means society is the 
most free, while “7” indicates it is the least free. Polity IV, on the other hand, measures 
democracy on a sliding scale from -10 (the least free) to 10 (the most free). I used both systems 
on separate analyses in order to make sure any conclusions were more easily generalizable to 
democracy, as opposed to one ranking system over another. Both Freedom House and Polity IV 
provide scores from their websites.
Three variables provide measurable values for the key ideas of socioeconomic 
modernization theory: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Purchasing Power Parity (known as PPP, 
or GDP per Capita), and the Urbanization Index. Gross Domestic Product measures the value of 
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all goods and services produced within a country’s borders within a specific time frame. In this 
case, the time frame was yearly. Purchasing Power Parity is a measure of GDP converted to 
international dollars. An international dollar is equivalent to one U.S. dollar. These data are 
available via the World Bank website, which provided all GDP and PPP data for this study. Both
variables provide the basic economic data upon which socioeconomic modernization theory 
hinges.The United Nations Urbanization Index provides data on how many people live in urban 
versus rural areas in each country. Modernization theory expects more advanced countries will 
have more people living in urban areas, so the UI provides a good proxy test. The United Nations
website provided all the data on the Urbanization Index.
Income inequality is most easily measured by the GINI coefficient. A country’s GINI 
number measures the income distribution of a nation.  Perfect equality between residents, where 
each has the same income, is a “0” on the index. On the other end of the scale at “1” is perfect 
inequality, where one person has all the money and everyone else has none. GINI data originated
from the World Bank website. If the theory of income inequality is correct, one would expect 
countries with less democracy to have more income inequality than those with a higher measure 
of democracy.
Population was the variable used for the theory of size determinant. This measure came 
directly from the CIA World Factbook website. Being a fairly straightforward measure, I sought 
to know if a large or small population had any impact on whether or not a country developed 
democracy.
I measured fragmentation in three ways: ethnic, linguistic and religious. All of the data 
came from the study by Alesina et. al. (2003). Although there are many theories on the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and democracy, there is no theoretical consensus on 
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whether high levels of fragmentation or low levels of fragmentation are more conducive to 
democracy.
I used the adult literacy rate of each country as the measure of literacy for each country. 
Literacy rate is expressed as a percentage of total population. The World Bank website provided 
the data for the literacy variable. In this case, “literacy” is defined as an individual who can read 
and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. The definition also includes 
“numeracy,” which is the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. Because literacy theory 
expects countries with high literacy rates are likely to be democracies, I expected to find literacy 
was strongly correlated with democratic development.
Polity IV provided the data for political instability on its website. Polity IV provides data 
on major conflicts, civil wars, and authoritarian reversals for each country. The Political 
Instability Events variable simply counted the number of events listed for each country. The 
Political Instability Years variable counted the number of years each country experienced these 
conflicts, civil wars, and coups. I theorized even though two countries may experience the same 
number of political instability events, the duration of the events may also be a significant factor 
in democratic development.
Case Studies
For the comparative case studies, I chose the countries of Mauritius and Gabon. Despite 
many similarities, the level of democracy for these countries differs considerably. Mauritius has 
a history of colonization by both the British and the French. The island nation is small in 
geographical size. Mauritius is a thriving economy, with high scores for GDP, PPP and a GINI 
score even lower than the United States. Many different ethnic groups inhabit the island, but do 
not hinder democratic function in the country. Mauritius does not have a long history of political 
instability, nor many political instability events. Mauritius has positive numbers for many of the 
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variables used in my analysis, making it a good proxy for what a well-functioning African 
democracy looks like.
Gabon, on the other hand, has a negative value for many of the variables in my analysis. 
Low scores for income equality and years of political instability characterize this jungle country. 
Gabon has a relatively high (among African countries) PPP, yet low scores for democracy, 
making Gabon a good test of Lipset’s socioeconomic modernization theory. Gabon is also 
characterized by high levels of ethnic and linguistic fragmentation with relatively few political 
instability events.
Mauritius and Gabon are relatively small countries with similar population sizes, and a 
significant number of citizens with foreign ancestry. Each country has natural resources upon 
which it relies for economic growth. Furthermore, each country has a history of western 
colonialism eventually leading to “democracy.” For Mauritius, democracy functions well and 
efficiently, while Gabon’s remains a democracy in name only. Mauritius and Gabon remain 
wildly different on not only scores for democracy, but human development and income 
inequality, as well. My case study analysis will use the results I obtained from the meta-analysis 
in order to determine what accounts for the incredibly different outcomes of the two countries.
Evaluation
In order to properly evaluate what effect each variable has upon democracy, I used a 
regression analysis. Because of its ability to evaluate each factor against the others with equal 
weight, a regression analysis provided a statistically solid and valid outcome. I used Polity IV 
and Freedom House democracy scores as the dependent variables, with the other key variables 
previously listed as dependents. Some analyses included different groupings of variables in order




Because of the sheer amount of scholarship linking colonial heritage with democratic 
development, I initially expected to find colonialism would be, by far, the most important. To my
surprise, my analysis showed colonial heritage to be statistically insignificant. My results 
reinforce the literature from Olsson showing Imperial-era colonization did not provide adequate 
time for democratic practices to be normalized into colonies.
The first run of analysis also showed population was the most important variable. The 
outcome required further research and analysis; I had to find more specific variables to explain 
the importance of the population variable. Refinement of the population variable was the genesis 
of the inclusion of literacy rates, GINI coefficients, and the urbanization index. Adding in these 
values proved to have a much higher explanatory value and added robustness to the findings I 
generated.
Finally, my original analysis only included the number of different ethnic groups in 
countries as the proxy for ethnic fragmentation. But this number had insufficient explanatory 
value, never reaching statistical significance. I then obtained more detailed fragmentation data 
from Alesina et. al. (2003). Data from their fragmentation study gave detailed breakdowns of 
ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation for each country. Inclusion of the more detailed 
fragmentation variables enabled a much more robust analysis.The results of my analysis 
contradict current literature. For Africa only, the most significant influences on democracy 
appear to be the number of years a country has experienced political instability, the number of 
political instability events a country experienced, and to what extent a country is linguistically 
fragmented. Ethnic fragmentation, income inequality, religious fragmentation, and urbanization 
are also strongly correlated with democracy, but do not reach statistical significance. 
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Interestingly, income and literacy rate appear to have almost no influence upon the development 
of democracy. When compared to non-African countries, political instability events, income 
inequality, and urbanization emerge as the most influential factors. However, linguistic and 
ethnic fragmentation are nearly statistically significant, as well.  When all countries are 
compared, the most influential factors in degree of democratization appear to be the number of 
political instability events, degree of urbanization, ethnic fragmentation, and religious 
fragmentation. Religious fragmentation is only significant in one model, but reaches near 
significance in all others.
Africa’s Democracy Scores
Non-Influential Factors
When I compared the Freedom House score for democracy with all variables, several 
previously identified by literature as being instrumental to democratic development do not reach 
statistical significance. While neither British nor French colonial history reached significance in 
the models, my case studies will show how these variables do make an impact in the real world.  
And while the variable for landlocked countries did not reach significance in Africa, it did do so 
for some models in the rest of the world. Most surprisingly, political instability events had no 
significant impact on Freedom House democracy scores, whereas the Polity IV model showed 
them to be highly significant.
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Table 1: Factors Affecting Freedom House and Polity IV Democracy Scores (Africa)
Variable Model 1 (FH) Model 2 (FH) Model 3 (P4) Model 4 (P4)
Political Instability (Years) -2.423* -2.351* -1.859 -2.340*
(.028) (.029) (.088) (.083)
Political Instability Events .057 .991 1.926 2.172*
(.369) (.364) (1.171) (1.081)
Ethnic Fragmentation -1.594 -.401
(1.286) (4.140)
Religious Fragmentation 1.923 1.278 1.948 .504
(1.161) (1.333) (3.617) (4.056)
GDP per Capita -.619 .078
(.002) (.007)
French Colony .010 -1.120
(.690) (2.181)












Adult Literacy Rate .935 1.134
(.019) (.055)
Observations 54 54 54 54
Adjusted R² .162 .116 .021 .105
 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001
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Possible Factors
A few other variables did not reach significance, but did come closer than the ones 
previously mentioned. These variables sometimes reached significance in certain analysis 
groupings. Consistent with theory, urbanization was positively correlated with scores of 
democracy. Ethnic fragmentation was negatively associated with democracy. Religious 
fragmentation, on the other hand, was positively associated with democracy scores in all models. 
My findings suggest ethnic fragmentation hinders democracy. Though religious freedom is more 
readily realized in more democratic countries, ethnic diversity may not be as well-tolerated.
Many of the same trends seen in the Freedom House results emerge in the Polity IV 
analysis when run against the available variables. Years of political instability reached 
significance at the .05 level, and, just as in the Freedom House analysis, was strongly negatively 
correlated. Ethnic fragmentation was also very negatively correlated, but the significance was not
as high. Religious fragmentation did not reach significance in this analysis, but the direction of 
its relationship remained positive, just as in the Freedom House analysis. French colonial history 
was much more influential in the Polity IV model, but no matter the variable configuration, 
colonial history never really came close to reaching statistical significance.
Significant Factors
The only variable reaching significance at the .05 level in the African Freedom House 
variable grouping was the number of years a country experienced political instability. The 
greater the number of years a country in Africa experienced turmoil, the less likely that country 
was to be democratic. Political instability theory predicted such a result. However, no other 
variables reaching significance for the Freedom House models was completely unexpected, 
given the amount of emphasis other theories have given to the other analyzed variables, 
particularly economic variables. Although my findings suggest economics could be important for
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some countries, African countries appear to rely upon the elimination of conflict in order to 
develop democracy. In the fourth model, the number of years of instability and the number of 
political instability events became the most significant predictor of democracy. Linguistic 
fragmentation has an even stronger positive correlation in the Polity IV model than in the 
Freedom House analysis. 
Although no concrete causal factors can be identified from the analysis, my models 
suggest there are really only two things correlated with democracy in Africa. The first, and most 
important, is number of years a country experiences political instability, the most consistent and 
generalizable finding for the Freedom House scores. Years of political instability is the only 
variable that reached true statistical significance for Freedom House democracy scores. For the 
Polity IV models, both political instability events and the number of instability years were 
statistically significant.  This result suggests African countries need some amount of conflict in 
order to develop democracy, but these conflicts cannot drag on indefinitely. The longer a country
experiences turmoil, the less likely the country is to be democratic. But when that same country 
experiences a greater number of instability events, a stronger, positive connection with 
democracy occurs. Additionally, increasing religious diversity appears to play a positive role, as 
well, but the mechanism through which it achieves the benefit is unclear. Religious autocracies 
may explain how singular religions can stifle democracies, but such a conclusion cannot be 
concretely drawn from the data.
Sorting African Factors
Each model values some factors over others. For instance, the landlocked variable was 
much more significant for the Freedom House analysis than for the Polity IV. The opposite was 
true for the number of political instability events and the colonization variables. The results 
suggest some kind of correlation for the previous factors. However, the real-world impact of 
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these factors is unclear from the data. Ethnic fragmentation was negatively associated with 
democracy for both models, but never quite reached statistical significance. Ethnic fragmentation
cannot be said to be one of the most important factors for democracy. However, the number of 
years a country in Africa experienced political instability was highly significant in both models. 
Although the data show some of these factors to be insignificant, my case studies will show their 
applicability..
What Causes Political Instability
When running an analysis with the number of political instability events as the dependent
variable, population size was the only variable significantly correlated with a higher number of 
events.  With the number of years of political instability as the dependent variable, not only is 
population size significant, but urbanization emerges as important, as well. While the correlation 
between the two dependent variables and population is positive, urbanization is negatively 
correlated.  Neither income inequality nor PPP approached significance, indicating these 
conflicts are solely over money, or the lack thereof. Literacy rate does not reach statistical 
significance, nor does any kind of fragmentation.
In-Depth Case Studies
My analysis revealed the factors appearing to be most important to African democratic 
development -- keeping political instability to a minimum, allowing for the possibility of 
democratic political revolution and the minimization of ethnic fragmentation. I used these 
variables to analyze the history of two African countries, Mauritius and Gabon, in order to 
determine whether or not my results would hold any prescriptive solutions for Africa. If either 
country showed how each variable could be used, or was missing from the equation, a practical 
application for these variables would emerge. Fortunately, both Mauritius and Gabon show how 
the most important variables were and were not used throughout each country’s development 
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after each became independent. Mauritius was very good at limiting political instability and 
integrating different ethnicities. Gabon, on the other hand, failed at both tasks.
Mauritius’ Positive Colonial Groundwork
The groundwork for democratic cooperation in Mauritius was established very early on 
via colonization by the French and British. Until Dutch settlers landed on the shores in 1507, 
Mauritius was an uninhabited island. The Dutch subsequently introduced the island's most 
important crop – sugarcane (Republic of Mauritius, 2012). But the Dutch were unable to turn a 
profit from the island, and abandoned Mauritius by 1710. The French recolonized the island in 
1715, bringing to Mauritius many structural improvements, such as shipyards and barracks. 
Under French colonization, sugar plantations really rooted themselves in the island, making a 
few French elites very wealthy via the importation of slave labor. In 1810, during the midst of 
the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain launched an attack and captured the island. The French 
officially ceded Mauritius to Britain in 1814 in the Treaty of Paris.
The transition to democracy is difficult and fraught with peril. Democracy requires a 
solid foundation in order to really work. The British slowly introduced reforms enabling the 
people to self-rule. The establishment of the rule of law started the reforms. Mauritius retained a 
French legal system, with mostly autonomous French-speaking natives in charge. The 
institutional framework appears to have been larger in Mauritius than in other colonies.  As 
citizens became more experienced, institutions grew larger, yet relied on an increasing number of
Mauritians instead of British overseers. Mauritius, with many different non-native ethnicities, 
“grew up” with a history of self-determination. 
The unique colonial history of Mauritius was an anomaly for British colonies. Most of 
the other countries in Africa did not experience colonial rule for the same long duration as 
Mauritius. As a colony, Mauritius had a large, functional state apparatus with four times the per 
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capita state revenue, three times the number of police officers, and ten times the number of 
magistrate court cases when compared to other British colonies (Lange, 2003). By the twentieth 
century, there were over 4,000 non-military state employees, of whom 93% were native 
Mauritians. By 1960, 85% of all officer-level position were filled by Mauritians, which was up 
from a high among British colonies of 65% in 1932. When the colony belonged to the French, 
extensive legal frameworks were established and carried over to British rule. However, because 
the governing body relied on parts of the Napoleonic Code, the legal system was usually 
administered by native French-speaking Mauritians instead of British officers (Lange, 2003). 
The Mauritian system thus had more autonomy than other British colonies. With nearly fifty-
seven court cases per 1,000 Mauritians, the rule of law was established nearly 100 years before 
formal independence. The duration Mauritius experienced colonial rule could explain why the 
island is such a comparatively successful democracy.
Today, Mauritius is a shining example of how democracy can work in Africa. The island 
currently boasts a population of 1.3 million people, and GDP per capita of $13,960 USD (World 
Bank, 2015). Mauritian press is considered completely free, and the island scores a 1.5 out 7 on 
the Freedom House scale (1 being the best score possible). Mauritius has made great strides in 
the Human Development Index in the past thirty years, going from a score of .546 in 1980 to its 
current .728 (out of a possible 1.000) (United Nations Development Programme, 2015). 
Mauritian governments have been made up of cross-party coalitions since independence 
(Gerring, 2011). 
Gabon’s Rocky Colonial Foundation
Originally the home of the pygmies and Bantu ethnic groups, Gabon lies on the north-
western rim of sub-Saharan Africa. The area was named “Gabao” by Portuguese traders, who 
arrived in the 15th century. The French were the first to explore the dense interior jungle in the 
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mid-eighteenth century. Soon after, the Dutch, British and French followed suit, and the area 
quickly became a hub of the Atlantic Slave trade (Bureau of African Affairs, 2012). The French 
began to consolidate their power in the region as early as 1849 by signing treaties with coastal 
chiefs. The capital, Libreville, arose out of a series of settlements along the Komo River. The 
French navy administered Gabon during the first three decades of French rule, illustrating just 
how unimportant the French considered the area (Rich, 2001).  Although the French claimed 
Gabon, serious administrative efforts did not occur until 1903. In the time leading up to 
administration, Gabonese coastal chiefs remained somewhat autonomous.
Mpongwe middlemen were able to determine the value of trade goods and products 
coming out of Gabon when dealing with foreign merchants. Foreign merchants would then 
provide advances of trade goods in exchange for these products. The arrangement was called the 
“trust” system. Foreign traders were routinely exasperated at the locals, who would often keep an
abundance of the trusts, stating trust value was much lower in relation to the goods provided in 
exchange. In 1876, a mandate by the French government spurred French colonial authorities to 
raise duties on imported goods (Rich, 2001) The taxes would raise the price of goods commonly 
used in transactions by Omyene coastal traders occupying Coastal Gabon and controlling the 
Ogooue River. Locals responded by refusing to sell food to European traders, launching a very 
effective boycott proving autonomy from the French. Boycotts would remain one of the most 
effective ways for locals to demonstrate a challenge to French authority over the next fifty years 
(Rich, 2001). Unlike Mauritius, colonial powers in Gabon never developed the authority to 
impose their own rule of law superseding that of the locals.
Today, Gabon has a population of 1.5 million people. According to Freedom House, 
Gabonese press is not free, and the country scores a lowly 5.5 out of 7 on the freedom scale, 
despite being a “democracy.” Gabon scores well on the GDP per capita index, with a very high 
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(for sub-Saharan Africa, at least) $13,170 USD. As noted earlier, though, the GDP number is a 
bit skewed by the very wealthy individuals who benefit from the oil and mineral profits in the 
country, with a GINI score of .457. Gabon ranks only 106 on the Human Development Index. 
Despite starting in 1980 with a score of .522 and Gabon has only risen to .674 today.  Mauritius 
started with a very similar score in 1980, but has made much better progress in the HDI in the 
same time frame.
Mauritius’ Colonial History Helps Limit Ethnic Fragmentation
When the British first arrived, government administrators depended upon the support of 
the French elite who were still loyal to the French ancien regime and had no love for the new 
French republic (Ballhatchet, 1985). However, the British soon grew to distrust the loyalty of the
French, and turned to the Creole population (which generally refers to any person born on the 
island or those of mixed birth) for support. In 1835, the British outlawed slavery on Mauritius, 
which began to shift the balance of the population, as plantation owners looked to indentured 
servants from India to fill the new labor void. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Mauritius 
was over half Indian. Just as before, the British began to distrust the Creoles' loyalty, and looked 
to Indian leaders for support. From 1883 to 1933, the Council of Government had just ten 
members, and here the British looked to place the new Indian candidates.
 Thus, the first legacy from colonialism was the history of representation of different 
minority and ethnic groups, like the non-native Indians. During the British war for South Africa, 
British officials began to plot ways to increase the influence of Indian voters on Mauritius. 
Because voting rights were based upon property ownership, there were only 295 Indian voters 
out of all possible 4,060 on the island (Ballhatchet, 1985). So, officials began to nominate Indian 
leaders whom British officials thought would remain loyal to the crown to the council should 
Mauritius eventually become an Indian colony, effectively increasing the influence of the Indian 
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population without the need to formally give Indian individuals any voting rights.  In 1947, male 
and female suffrage was introduced, based upon literacy requirements. Because many Indian 
women remained illiterate, the French and Creole supported suffrage. The increased votes among
non-Indians would possibly confer an advantage to the French and Creole. The Council of 
Government was disbanded by the British, and put into place the Legislative Council, composed 
of nineteen elected members, twelve appointed members and three ex-officio members (Republic
of Mauritius, 2012). When universal suffrage was proposed in 1956, Indians, who had originally 
opposed female suffrage, were fully behind the idea, considering Indians had become a majority 
of the population on the island. However, minority groups, such as the Muslim and Chinese, also
began to assert some authority. Eventually, all groups agreed to reforms for universal suffrage 
including provisions for representation of minority groups. What emerged was the structure of 
government seen today.
Instead of a “winner take all” system, Mauritians have embraced the notion of 
consociationalism, the idea that all minority groups are guaranteed representation in the 
government. Prior to the election, each candidate must register as a member of one of the four 
officially recognized ethnicities: Hindu, Muslim, Sino-Mauritian, or General Population. 
Mauritius has twenty three-seat constituencies, half in rural areas populated by the Hindu 
Indians, who make up a little over half of the ethnicity of the island, and half in the urban areas, 
where everyone else lives (Srebrenik, 2002). The three candidates in each constituency with the 
highest vote totals are elected. Additionally, there are up to eight seats awarded to the party 
whose candidates lost their elections. Following the election, any group with a representation 
level below the actual percentage of that group’s population level is awarded seats to correct the 
imbalance through the “Best Loser System” (Fessha et. al., 2015). That is, the candidates who 
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performed best without being elected and who also represent the most under-represented ethnic 
group following the elections are awarded the final seats.
The abolition of slavery helped integrate Mauritian society. Former slaves moved to the 
capital of Port Louis or to small fishing villages to work for themselves (Lange, 2003). To 
compensate for the loss of labor, 300,000 indentured servants from India and 1,000 Chinese 
came to Mauritius. However, the former slaves were generally subject to ill-treatment, just as 
they had been as slaves, and soon after, as a result of movements geared toward securing better 
treatment for indentured servants, contracts tying workers to estates were abolished. These 
workers secured better rights and began to buy the less-productive land sold off by estate owners.
Rural settlements soon popped up with local communities and associations. Ethnic integration is 
yet another institution that was a precursor to democracy in Mauritius.
Political consensus would serve them well, as economic woes plagued the country 
throughout the 20th century. Because Mauritius was so dependent upon sugar, minor fluctuations
in harvest yields and world prices would have significant adverse effects on the economy. When 
an economic crisis hit in 1907, sugar plantations were under enormous pressure. There was a call
for government-backed loans to help out the planters. But, in accordance with free-market 
principles, the colonial authorities refused, preferring instead to form a commission to see if cuts 
could be made in different governmental areas to make up the difference (Ballhatchet, 1985). 
The government eventually tried to solve the problem of reliance on sugarcane by diversifying 
into tourism, manufacturing, banking and technology. However, diversifying measures proved to
be ineffective. Additionally, the Mauritian government was unable to control spending. As a 
result, foreign direct investment shrank drastically and public debt rose (Gerring, 2011), forcing 
Mauritius to turn to the World Bank and IMF for help. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
from the World Bank and IMF standby arrangements were prescribed to get Mauritius on the 
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path to prosperity. Both the World Bank and IMF devalued the currency, reduced the deficit and 
instituted reforms to increase foreign capital reserves (Gerring, 2011). The reform measures 
worked beautifully, and Mauritius produced such extraordinary growth, the island was termed an
“African Tiger,” a play on the epithet given to similar rises in prosperity among the “Asian 
Tigers.” But no prosperity would have been possible without democratic cooperation. 
Consociationalism has served to foster a sense of cooperation and consensus among 
parties, allowing policymakers to carry through on policy decisions made by previous 
administrations. When Mauritius encountered economic difficulties, the World Bank 
recommended Structural Adjustment Programs to help alleviate the problems.  Continuity is, no 
doubt, one of the prime reasons the SAPs have worked so well in Mauritius. The SAPs 
recommended by the World Bank and IMF were followed through three consecutive 
governments. That the governments all decided the reforms had to be followed is nothing short 
of a democratic miracle, considering the political and ethnic unrest just two short decades before.
The history of democracy throughout the colonial period and the institution of consociational 
arrangements no doubt played a huge role in these developments. 
Post-independence, minority groups retained a voice in the government. 
Consociationalism provided an avenue to address minority groups’ issues. For instance, the SAP 
economic reforms were generally conservative reforms. In an effort to appease the minority 
groups, government spending was reduced without reducing social welfare outlays (Gerring, 
2011). Yet, in a typical conservative fashion, social welfare outlays in the future were restricted. 
Each group got a “win,” and, as a result, were much more willing to see the reforms through to 
the end. Again, consociational arrangements increased the legitimacy of the government.
Consociationalism provided a steadying influence over the transition to democracy. The 
importance of the pursuit of centrist policies and the inclusion of minority groups in 
33
representation cannot be overstated. Integration of ethnic groups that led to the decrease in 
political instability that generally proves to be a fractious force in democracies in Africa. 
Consociationalism allowed the development of economic prosperity through following the 
prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank. But, even Mauritius’ unique system of government 
has roots in the institutional representative framework going all the way back to the 1800s.  
Institutions appear to be, by far, the foundation of democracy in Mauritius. The effectiveness of 
the Mauritian government in creating a voice for each different ethnic group to address concerns 
and manage political unrest appears to be the most important factor in the development of 
democracy in Mauritius. This is consistent with the previous analysis of the larger factors of 
African democracy.
Gabon’s History of Ethnic Fractionalization
Natives of Gabon always saw themselves as having at least the same status as foreigners, 
a sentiment that would later be used to divide the different ethnic groups in Gabon and prevent 
the kind of camaraderie and positive nationalism that could lead to more democratic outcomes 
for Gabon. Omyene traders, along with most coastal African communities, treated Europeans as 
strangers owing the locals respect and gifts. The native traders would often manipulate the 
differences in the value of trade goods to their advantage. The Omyene quickly adapted to the 
colonial period by maintaining the right to define the terms of trade, often appointing Europeans 
as official emissaries (Rich, 2001). European officials would often serve as intermediaries 
between communities along the Ogooue River and the European powers. Often, the negotiations 
involved the trading of slaves, which had become the main economic occupation of the Omyene 
(Rich, 2001). The abolition of slavery in various countries in the 1860s and 1870s damaged the 
incomes of these river traders, who sometimes turned to attacking passing European vessels to 
support themselves. The abolition of slavery meant the loss of prestige and independence for 
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Gabonese men, just like other West African coastal settlements. The end of Atlantic slave export 
business and the growth of European merchant markets caused Gabonese men to shift from 
entrepreneurial roles to wage labor and become representatives of European firms.
French was taught as the primary language, reinforcing the images and ideals of the 
Democratic Party of Gabon. Due to the large number of natural resources, namely oil and 
minerals, Gabon flourished economically. Gabon’s economic prosperity led to the necessity for a
large number of infrastructure projects. However, due to Gabon’s size and lack of a work force, 
foreign labor was required to complete the infrastructure projects. In the 1970s, nearly 100,000 
people, some 20% of the population, were foreign workers (Gray, 1998). The Gabonese valued 
the relatively high income from oil and mineral deposits. 
The state continued to worsen the division between Gabonese and foreigners. In 1984, 
President Omar Bongo insisted immigration was a problem and had to be controlled (Gray, 
1998). Bongo first decried prostitution, identifying all prostitutes as foreigners. The President 
continued on, saying foreigners should be “handed over to the army” so that once “five or six 
soldiers have been on top them,” the foreigners would see prostitution is not wanted in Gabon. 
Next, Bongo railed against the Lebanese, leading to an outbreak of looting directed at Lebanese 
merchants in the city of Libreville. Finally, foreign worker cards were issued to the immigrants. 
However, the cards came at an extremely high price, costing $200 USD for the card, and another 
$1,000 if the worker decided to leave and then return to Gabon. Today, tensions between the 
Gabonese and the foreign contingent remain high, but have been somewhat tempered by 
economic hardship affecting both the natives and non-natives. Still, nearly 90% of the wealth in 
the country is controlled by only 20% of the population (Bureau of African Affairs, 2012).
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How Mauritius Limits Political Violence and Instability
Throughout the history of the island, the Mauritian government had to deal with the 
challenge of political representation for the citizenry. Accommodation can be seen in cases like 
the agricultural labor riots in Mauritius in 1937, 1938, and 1943, which forced the Mauritian 
government to create state institutions representing the labor class. The economic depression of 
the 1930s led to low sugar prices and low wages (Alladin, 1986). Small planters were unable to 
choose to whom the sugar could be sold (Lange, 2003). On a more general scale, rural sugarcane 
farmer interests were ignored altogether. But, because of local community associational 
networks (village and district councils) popping up, there was significant organizational structure
to the protests, which included sit-ins, strikes and even destruction of property and violence. The 
protests happened to coincide with the British government's readiness to decentralize 
administration and services. Legislative reform was introduced through universal suffrage, and 
the first Mauritian prime minister was elected in 1961, seven years before formal independence. 
The government created the Department of Labor, which could effectively mediate between 
labor and producer associations.
Mauritius' transition from a colony to an independent state was hardly seamless. There 
were many rebellions and conflicts requiring British troop intervention past the date of official 
independence. In the years surrounding independence, contention developed along party lines, 
which usually followed ethnic lines. The Mauritius Social Democratic Party (PMSD) was the 
conservative party, supported by the Franco-Mauritian elite and Creole. The liberal Mauritian 
Labor Party was supported by the Indo-Mauritians, and the Mauritian Militant Movement was a 
Marxist party supported by mixed ethnicities (Gerring, 2011). Each party was distrustful of the 
others, and political disagreement frequently turned to ethnic violence. Disorder and political 
chaos lasted into the 1970s, until voting along ethnic lines began to shift to voting along class 
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lines. Because the PMSD catered only to the interests of the rich Franco-Mauritians, the support 
base of the Creole, who made up a far larger proportion of its total vote, disappeared. The PMSD
began to adopt more centrist policies in order to win back the poor Creoles. The liberal MMM 
party realized radical positions could not entice a majority, either, and began to move toward the 
center, so as to attract Hindu landowners. With each party adopting less divisive positions, 
violence subsided and cooperation began in earnest.
Gabon’s Policies Did Not Limit Violence
Libreville erupted with violence in the 1870s, as a series of murders struck the city. 
Leopards were a powerful symbol of sorcery in the area, and the murderers dressed up as 
“Leopard Men” while perpetrating the acts. Murderers mutilated corpses with what appeared to 
be claw marks and left paw prints near the bodies. French officials rounded up several slaves, 
and executed ten via firing squad, but the murders continued. Slaves and women were the 
preferred targets. Women, in particular, were targeted due to the increasing ability, via 
prostitution, to challenge male authority (Rich, 2001). In the rural estuary region, armed groups 
of Africans regularly fought each other as well as the French up until the first World War (Rich, 
2007). The failure of French officials to stop the killings and the fighting underscored the lack of 
institutionalism pervading the country.The ability of a state to stop violence, especially violence 
targeting minority groups, is a crucial factor in the development of democracy, as shown by the 
Polity IV and Freedom House analyses. 
Tensions between “rightful” or “native” Gabonese and immigrants had already exploded 
into violence during a 1962 football match. Gabon and Congo were playing for the Coupe des 
Tropiques. The match ended with some 30,000 Congolese attacking the referee and threatening 
the Gabonese national team. When news of the attack reached Libreville, Gabonese retaliated 
against the immigrant Congolese in the city, resulting in two days of rioting, leaving nine people 
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dead and another thirty wounded (Gray, 1998). Hundreds of Congolese homes were burned to 
the ground, and 2,700 Congolese were expelled from Pointe-Noire.
 Some 60,000 refugees came to Gabon from Equatorial Guinea in the 1970s, as well. The 
refugees were of Fang ethnicity and had relationships with many Gabonese. Still, the large influx
of people put pressure on an already strained food supply, which led to a brief eruption of 
violence in Libreville, mainly in the market centers. Foreigners from Benin were blamed for the 
violence, and some 10,000 were expelled on July 23, 1978 (Gray, 1998).  A 1981 football match 
was another catalyst for ethnic violence; only this time, the violence was directed toward 
Cameroonian ethnics. In Libreville, eyewitnesses even reported the police were seen looting 
Cameroonian markets (Gray, 1998). Once again, the government expelled non-Gabonese in the 
form of 10,000 Cameroonians.
Mauritius Empowers Locals to Provide Services and Education
Village and district councils were organized by the government of Mauritius and formally
recognized soon after World War II, which promoted an active democracy on the island. Village 
councils had only limited supervision, with one civil commissioner and five technical assistants 
per council. The councils were vital in the development of schools, roads, health centers, town 
halls, and sanitation and water departments (Lange, 2003). Villages oversaw their own school 
systems, and the number of schools nearly doubled from 128 in 1946 to 230 by 1967. In 2011, 
the government spent 13% of its budget on education (Republic of Mauritius, 2012). Universal 
education echoed another advantage of colonialism – the tradition of education and literacy. The 
Creole received education as far back as French rule, and even during that time, many of the 
middle class were doctors, teachers and lawyers (Ballhatchet, 1985). During British colonial rule,
there were many state-funded schools. The Royal College was one such school. The wealthier 
boys were funneled to Britain for higher education, while poorer men were sometimes granted 
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Royal College scholarships in order to study in Britain (Ballhatchet, 1985). The aforementioned 
educational tradition continues to the present day. Though education does not emerge as a 
significant factor in my analysis for generalized African democratic development, it does appear 
to be an important part of the history of political representation of all ethnicities in Mauritius. 
Village councils were also instrumental in the creation of numerous social welfare 
programs, including poverty alleviation and health improvements. Between 1950 and 1967, 
thirty-two child and maternal welfare centers were opened in rural areas. The government led the
village councils to encourage the local populations to control diseases with canalization of rivers,
draining marshes, construction of irrigation systems and the application of insecticides to the 
interior of buildings (Lange, 2003). Such efforts resulted in the elimination of death from 
malaria, which was 3,534 in 1946, representing 23% of all deaths on the island, by 1956. 4,052 
deaths came from infectious diseases in 1948, but by 1967, only 187 deaths came from disease. 
Poverty alleviation was encouraged with the use of poor-law boards, and village councils 
distributed funds to needy village members. Mauritius had over 120,000 cases of state assistance 
in 1967, yet the office employed only ten people. The 200 mutual aid associations on the island 
were vital in helping to distribute assistance funds. Cooperative credit societies were also the 
domain of local village councils. Co-op programs fielded 33,000 members in 320 different co-
ops by 1960. Cooperative credit societies were instrumental in the near doubling of sugar cane 
production from 1912 to 1959 (Lange, 2003).
“Thus  it  appears  that  the  benefits  provided  by  the  state
strengthened an already dense society, while societal associations
increased the power of a state already possessing high levels of
coordination  capacity,  thereby  promoting  a  virtuous  circle  of
development in colonial  Mauritius and providing an institutional
endowment needed for continued, broad-based development after
independence (Lange, 2003).”
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The effectiveness of the village associations in promoting education, improving the dialogue 
between interest groups (such as farmers) and the government, and the drastic improvement in 
health is amazing. 
Gabon’s Disenfranchisement of the Population
Rather than producing food, Gabon has long imported it. During the first World War, 
food scarcity proved to be a problem having long-lasting effects on the country, dividing Gabon 
in ways persisting to the present day. Slaves working local farms had been one way the wealthy 
Mpongwe fed themselves. The Mpongwe’s inability to secure new sources of labor required 
locals to turn to banked wealth for the provision of food. At the beginning of World War One, 
French and German troops fought in Gabon and Cameroon. Victorious African forces, who had 
fought for the French, swept into Libreville like a tidal wave in 1916, doubling the population. 
Laws gave military members the right to acquire food before the local populace. Due to the 
scarcity of food, soldiers frequently bought and resold at higher prices. Local production could 
not keep up with the increased demand and famine set in. The few farmers that did operate, 
namely of Fang ethnicity, were often subject to extortion by African guards along the roads to 
Libreville, extortion of bribes by village chiefs along canoe waterways, and high taxes (Rich, 
2007).  Additionally, wild animals were eating the crops of manioc and rice, but high prices for 
arms and ammunition prevented the locals from defending their food.
The crisis worsened in 1918-1919. Georges Guibet, the French head of the estuary 
region, suggested suspending taxation and relaxing gun laws in order to allow farmers to 
concentrate on producing food. The governor rejected Guibet’s ideas, insisting “[The Africans'] 
laziness is the only reason they lack food (Rich, 2007).” The situation remained desperate, and in
1920, locals began to protest colonial officials. The boycott was not immediately successful in 
lowering food prices, but did sufficiently embarrass the administration so badly, Guibet was 
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moved to Chad. The food crisis clearly shows the inability of the rural people to influence local 
governmental authority. Citizens’ disenfranchisement continues to the present day.
Early on, Gabon’s government did not provide for the education of the populace. 
Catholic and Protestant missions were the main form of education in the country, but these 
mission efforts were routinely hampered by large bouts of disease and low levels of interest 
(Rich, 2001). However, the schools did attract a large number of free children, whose parents 
asked the missionaries to teach the children foreign languages. British and German traders 
offered high wages for graduates fluent in English, and education thus became a route to 
personal economic prosperity for the Mpongwe. Missions regularly accepted female children 
into schools, where the children were taught English or French, cooking and how to sew and do 
laundry. Proficiency in the domestic arts made the girls attractive prospects for prostitution. One 
woman, Marie Ndar, was so prolific that she earned enough money to purchase her own slaves.
Unlike the citizens of British Mauritius, Gabonese under the rule of the French had no 
political rights (Gray, 1998).  Although citizens had some small amount of civil rights, only a 
very select number of Gabonese elites were able to obtain French citizenship. Freedoms of 
speech, movement and association were severely restricted. Rule was mostly authoritarian, as the
people were subject to unpaid, forced labor when the colonial state needed a workforce for 
public projects (Gray, 1998). Punishment was often arbitrary and lacked formal codification. In 
1946, the French Lamine Gueye law granted French citizenship to African subjects. Gabonese 
political elites were elected and sent to the French National Assembly and various governing 
bodies. However, politicians remained beholden to both local electorates and the powerful 
French political and economic interests, even after independence in 1960. Because of the 
inability of politicians to make truly independent decisions, a single-party state developed, 
reinforced via the educational system.
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Gabon Illustrates Why Low Levels of Instability Can Be Negative
The electoral process in Gabon has never been quite stable. The Democratic Party of 
Gabon (PDG) has consolidated and split into multiple parties many times. Omar Bongo was the 
head of the PDG until his death in office in 2009. In 1990, the PDG moved to have multi-party 
elections in Gabon once more. The new elections would have more than one presidential 
candidate, elected for a five-year term, and could only be re-elected one time. Bongo was re-
elected in 1993 with 51% of the vote. Opposition parties refused to validate the results, and civil 
disturbances began again. The violence concluded with the Paris Accords in 1994, when 
members of the opposition party were finally included in the government. However, the 
inclusive arrangement soon disintegrated, and Bongo once again consolidated power. In 2003, 
Bongo was successful in changing the terms of the Constitution to allow re-election as many 
times as the president desired and for a term of seven years instead of five (Reuters, 2009).  Ali 
Bongo, the son of Omar Bongo, assumed power upon his father's death in 2009. Ali Bongo was 
recently re-elected in a landslide election in 2011, amidst much vocal opposition calling for a 
boycott of the election (BBC News, 2011). Without political instability events, non-democratic 
governments cannot be overturned and replaced with democracies.
Analyzing the Differences
Both Mauritius and Gabon began life as colonies in the same time period. However, 
unlike the French, the British empowered Mauritian citizens to get involved in the democratic 
process far earlier and to have more power to influence government. Village councils and 
associations were instrumental in the development of Mauritius, from taking the lead on 
education and health to organizing agricultural labor groups. By contrast, the Gabonese 
government restricted citizens’ ability to form associations. Even by British standards, Mauritius 
had a lot of state employees. The Mauritian government managed to have institutional control 
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over the island, as well as a good handle on violence. When violence did erupt in Mauritius, it 
was quickly controlled and the root of the issue was ferreted out in order to prevent a recurrence. 
By contrast, violence in Gabon has persisted on and off for many years. Despite being a French 
colony, Gabon's legal system severely lacks authority and legitimacy. Mauritius, on the other 
hand, used the French legal apparatus quite well as the foundation of a well-rounded and robust 
legal apparatus.
After the abolition of slavery in Mauritius, many workers sought to purchase land. Even 
former Indian indentured servants got in on the act. In Gabon, despite having much more land 
available than Mauritius, land ownership was tightly restricted and so did not develop to any 
great extent. In Gabon, rural producers were routinely disenfranchised, whereas in Mauritius, the
government created a special labor board to facilitate communication between businesses and 
labor interests. Gabon and Mauritius are both highly ethnically heterogeneous, and both have had
their bouts with ethnic hostility. However, in Mauritius, ethnic disagreement has evolved into 
simple political disagreement, whereas the Gabonese still see ethnic tensions as a sore point of 
contentious disagreement and potential violence. Gabonese ethnic contention has grown into 
outright contempt for immigrants. Heavy-handed controls and a lack of border mobility 
characterize Gabon. Controls so strict do not exist in Mauritius.
In order to determine what lessons may be applied across countries, what cannot be 
controlled or is irrelevant must first be identified and discounted. This leaves institutions as the 
foundational difference between Mauritius and Gabon. Mauritius and Gabon are nearly identical 
in size, with similar ethnic heterogeneity. Education and literacy rates are impressive for both 
countries. According to the UNICEF, Gabon's literacy rate is equal to Mauritius’ score. While 
literacy statistics can be fudged quite often, and the published numbers may not quite reflect 
reality, the oil revenue in Gabon allows them to spend quite liberally on education, even if much 
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of the education is teaching the PDG party line. Put simply, the British invested heavily in 
building strong, lasting institutions empowering the Mauritians to eventually self-govern. The 
French did nothing of the sort in Gabon. 
Mauritius has good governance, while Gabon does not. Good governance is defined by a 
few characteristics. The first is how much of a voice the citizens have in the government and 
whether or not the government is held accountable for its actions. Accountability gets into the 
notion of political equality (Rothstein, 2008). Gabon clearly does not have political equality. 
Gabon’s systematic disenfranchisement of ethnic minorities and more general restriction of 
access to the political process is anathema to good governance. The PDG has said in the past a 
multiple party government is impossible in Gabon because the population is too small (Bureau of
African Affairs, 2012). The case of Mauritius shows the PDG’s conclusion to be a clear 
falsehood. Gabon must take things one step further, though, and institute a form of 
Consociationalism. While some critics have accused consociational agreements of further 
deepening ethnic differences and reinforcing ethnosectarianism (Kasenally, 2007), there is no 
doubt consociationalist arrangements provide for the decline of violence and move toward inter-
ethnic peace (Gerring, 2011).
The second characteristic of good governance is political stability and the absence of 
violence. Gabon has certainly had political stability, but stability has come at the cost of 
undermining the democratic process. The Bongo administration continually manipulated the 
electorate in order to retain as much power as possible, and Bongo’s political machinations show
no sign of abating. As the data show, the number of events of political instability are not what 
undermines democracy. In fact, Gabon shows why a lack of political instability can be bad; if an 
authoritarian government never loses power, democracy can never take root. Simultaneously, 
Gabon has had a large number of years of political instability and violence. Gabon’s years of 
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political instability and violence lines up with the data showing that the longer an African 
country experiences violence and instability, the less likely that country is to be democratic. 
Neither long term political instability nor a large number of political instability events are seen in
Mauritius.
The Rest of the World
Table 2: Factors Affecting Freedom House and Polity IV Democracy Scores (World)
Variable Model 1 (FH) Model 2 (FH) Model 3 (P4) Model 4 (P4)
Political Instability (Years) -.621 -.345 .009 .013
(.018) (.017) (.060) (.059)
Political Instability Events -3.195** -2.955** -1.688 -1.474
(.240) (.232) (.802) (.793)
Ethnic Fragmentation -1.576 -1.005 -1.950 -1.439
(1.048) (1.026) (3.499) (3.506)
Religious Fragmentation .595 .648 .607 .464
(.970) (.898) (3.239) (3.069)
GDP per Capita .082 -.118
(.000) (.000)
Landlocked -2.236* -2.463* -1.313 -1.640
(.497) (.505) (1.659) (1.724)
Population .373 .157
(.000) (.000)
Linguistic Fragmentation -.098 -.486 -.516 -.865





Adult Literacy Rate -.200 .474
(.020) (.069)
Observations 116 116 116 116
Adjusted R² .155 .223 .062 .097
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p <.001
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Comparing Africa to the Rest of the World
I ran the same analyses on both the African countries and rest of the countries of the 
world, excluding Africa. The results were surprising. The only variable Africa had in common 
with the rest of the world was political instability events. The political instability events variable 
was significant in both groups. However, the direction was different. For Africa, the number of 
events was positively associated with better scores for democracy, while the number of events 
was negatively associated with democracy in the rest of the world. Political instability years was 
significant for Africa, but not the rest of the world. Finally, for the world, a high level of income 
inequality was negatively correlated with democracy, as was a country being landlocked. Both 
the GINI and landlocked variables failed to reach statistical significance for Africa. These data 
suggest African democracy is, indeed, a special case requiring a different approach from the rest 
of the world.
Factors of fragmentation - ethnic, linguistic, and religious - never reached statistical 
significance in the my models. However, both ethnic and linguistic fragmentation had negative 
correlation with scores for democracy. Interestingly, religious fragmentation had a positive 
correlation with higher levels of democracy, just as the African models did.
Three variables stuck out as being most important to world democracy scores. The first, 
and most significant, was the number of political instability events. The number of political 
instability events had a very strong negative correlation with scores for democracy, reaching 
significance at the .005 level. Reaching significance at the .05 level in two models was the 
variable for landlocked countries, although it remained negatively correlated in each model. Only
one variable reached statistical significance at the .05 level in the Polity IV analysis, the GINI 
variable. High levels of income inequality were negatively associated with scores for democracy.
These results are quite different than the ones obtained for Africa.
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Conclusion
Africa and the rest of the world require different approaches to democratic development. 
While non-African countries fare poorly in democratic measures when experiencing higher 
political instability events, for Africa, instability events can be a good thing. As the case of 
Gabon shows, lack of political revolution is not necessarily a good thing. African revolution 
should be encouraged in non-democracies. However, revolution should not be allowed to spiral 
into years of political instability. The number of politically unstable years is negatively 
correlated with African democracy, similar to non-African countries. While the historical 
habitualization of democratic ideals of Mauritius may not be replicable, the lessons of 
consociationalism are applicable to any country struggling with ethnic fragmentation, as is the 
case for many African countries. Gabon illustrates the dangers of consistent ethnic 
fragmentation, especially when fragmentation turns to outright hatred and disenfranchisement of 
minority groups. Because neither urbanization nor income inequality reached statistical 
significance for African countries, but did for non-African countries, the lessons are not so clear. 
Perhaps when ethnic fragmentation issues are relieved in African countries, other variables, such 
as GINI and UI, may become more important.
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Discussion
When I compared the factors influencing African democracy to the factors affecting the 
rest of the world, Africa’s requirements for democracy were quite different. In order to maximize
African countries’ chances for democracy, my analysis suggests mitigating instability should be 
the number one priority. For Freedom House democracy scores, the number of years of 
instability is the number one predictor of African democracy. The longer an African country is 
unstable, the less likely it is to be democratic. The same is true for non-African countries. 
However, the Polity IV results reveal the number of political instability events is positively 
correlated with African democracy scores; as the number of political instability events increases, 
scores for democracy also rise. For non-African countries, the opposite is true; political 
instability events are negatively correlated with scores for democracy. Because of the difference 
between African and non-African factors, approaches to influencing a democratic transition must
be different.
Further analysis revealed two primary causes for political instability and instability 
events -- population and urbanization. As population size increases, so does the number of 
political instability events. Urbanization, on the other hand, is negatively correlated with 
instability events. No other variables reach statistical significance, indicating there are no current
theories on democratic development offering a comprehensive explanation of why and how 
African countries develop democracy. Population dispersal and urbanization in African countries
are neither immediately achievable nor practical. The development of realistic solutions to 
Africa’s political instability problems will require further refinement of the root cause of 
instability. 
The two case studies of Mauritius and Gabon show how each influential democratic 
variable played out in the real world. In Mauritius’ case, violence and instability was controlled, 
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and in Gabon, ran rampant. Mauritius mitigated violence through the use of consociational 
agreements and integration of different ethnic groups into political leadership positions. The rule 
of law was established early on during Mauritian governmental development and used 
consistently throughout its colonial history and during independence. Gabon, on the other hand, 
kept ethnic groups suppressed and disenfranchised throughout history. Gabon attempted to 
consolidate authority in the hands of the few in order to maintain power, but violence remained a
problem. In the case of Mauritius, political instability was controlled, and ethnic diversity was 
used in a positive democratic manner. In Gabon, ethnic diversity was used to drive a wedge 
between citizens, and the condemnation of minorities was the cause of years of political 
violence. The different ways each country dealt with ethnic minority groups show how Mauritius
ended up with a high score for democracy, while Gabon ended up at the bottom. The outcomes 
reflect both the Freedom House and Polity IV analysis I performed for African countries.
The results of my analysis on the rest of the world highlight large differences between 
Africa and other countries. Variables important to the rest of the world are insignificant in 
Africa, and some variables important in Africa are not influential for the rest of the world. In 
non-African countries, the number of political instability events is negatively correlated with 
scores for democracy. The opposite is true for Africa. Income equality and high levels of 
urbanization are correlated with democracy in non-African countries, while these two variables 
fail to reach significance for Africa. 
Applications for Current Theory
I. Colonialism
Some current theory posits African colonies were not exposed to colonial rule long 
enough for democratic ideals to take root. Other theories connect colonialism with current-day 
income inequality. The case of Mauritius directly conflicts with the length of exposure theory; 
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Colonial rule in Mauritius laid the groundwork for democratic development and exposure was 
clearly of an adequate length. Additionally, income inequality, while a significant factor in non-
African countries, is not a significant predictor of African democracy. Therefore, the current 
theory must be modified.
The beneficial legacy of colonialism for Mauritius is the incorporation of minority groups
into political office and governance. Integration, not segregation and oppression, was a key 
factor in democratic development. I would suggest, for African countries, the democratic benefit 
of colonialism was seen when the colonial power chose to rule while empowering the local 
population. When colonial powers, perhaps due to economic, logistical or militaristic challenges,
tried to suppress ethnic minorities or disenfranchise the local population, no benefits were seen. 
Length of colonial occupation may be correlated with the extent of indigenous empowerment, 
but may not be the sole determinant. Clearly, local populations could have been, as in the case of
Mauritius, empowered to make decisions and become involved in local politics. But this was not 
the case in every country, as the case of Gabon clearly demonstrates.
II. Modernization
IIA. Socioeconomic Modernization
The data do not support the theory of socioeconomic modernization leading to 
democracy. Neither the African analysis nor the world analysis placed any significance upon 
income inequality or PPP. The two case studies of Mauritius and Gabon do not support economic
modernization theory, either. Both countries’ GDP per capita are similar, yet only one remains a 
democracy. Neither prosperity nor destitution appears to drive the growth of democracy 
anywhere on the globe.
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IIB. Cultural Modernization
While the statistical analysis for Africa does not show any significance for cultural 
modernization theory, there is ample case study evidence for its efficacy. The institutions 
established in Mauritius certainly played a key role in maintaining peace and democracy. The 
same institutions are not present in Gabon, where violence and instability have reigned for 
decades. Worldwide, I find urbanization positively correlated with democracy, showing some 
degree of cultural modernization is important. The mechanisms through which institutions 
benefit democracy may be different in Africa than the rest of the world. Africa is one of the most
ethnically diverse and divided continents. Here, institutions working to integrate and empower 
minority groups are at their most effective. Elsewhere, institutions may function differently, 
explaining why urbanization is more important in the rest of the world.
III. Income Inequality
Because the measures for PPP were insignificant for Africa, the measures of income 
inequality unsurprisingly failed to reach significance for the African analysis. African democracy
simply does not appear to be driven by economic factors. A relatively low economic output, 
when Africa is compared to the rest of the world, may be one explanation. But, more likely, such
matters are overshadowed by ethnic conflict and violence. Ethnic conflict and violence are seen 
elsewhere in the world. But as a whole, income inequality is a much stronger driver of 
democracy for the non-African countries. GINI measurements did turn out to be statistically 
significant for non-African countries. However, because the variables for political instability 
were wildly different for African countries vs. non, it could be that once political instability 
events and political conflict is relatively under control, measures such as GINI emerge as being 
more significant for African countries.
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IV. Population and Literacy
Population and adult literacy rate did not reach statistical significance for either the 
African or non-African analyses. Preliminary testing revealed population was a significant 
contributor to democracy. When more variables were added to the analysis, population failed to 
reach statistical significance. The most recent finding contradicts the theories advancing 
population and high literacy rate as predictors of democracy. While either variable would appear 
to go hand-in-hand with democracy, each variable may only tangentially relate to democracy. 
Whatever the relationship, my findings do not show population or literacy to be significantly 
related to democracy in either Africa or the world.
V. Ethnic Fragmentation
Ethnic fragmentation failed to reach statistical significance in each model, but did have a 
strong negative correlation with democracy. My findings tentatively support Easterly and 
Levine’s notion that ethnic fragmentation contributes to political instability. Moffazar theorized 
one ethnic group not holding sway over another strengthens democracy. The case study analysis 
provides evidence of the applicability of Moffazar’s theory for African countries.  Although 
consociationalism may not be the best solution for non-African countries as a whole, 
consociationalism could be beneficial for non-African non-democracies, which should be 
investigated in future research.
Best Theoretical Fit
The juxtaposition of Mauritius’ case study and of the analyses results suggests 
institutions are the most important factor for African democracy. Institutions provide political 
stability, which directly correlates to increased scores for democracy. Institutions do not mean 
just the buildings or organizations interacting directly with government functions, but also 
organizations and methods fostering citizen involvement in the democratic process. The 
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mechanism by which institutions contribute to democracy are community interaction and ethnic 
empowerment. Through institutions, consociational agreements are made, equalizing the power 
between different ethnic groups, a key factor in strengthening democracy (Moffazar, 2003). 
Consociationalism provides proportional representation for ethnic groups, instilling a sense of 
fairness in the democratic process. The case study of Mauritius is a shining example of how 
democracy is strengthened through consociationalism.
Limitations
My research does have a few limitations. The first is the R-squared value some of the 
data analyses was low, indicating some factors remain unaccounted for in my analyses. More 
variables may be required. Degrees of freedom in my analysis was necessarily low due to the 
limited number of country data available. Alternatively, more specific or more unaccounted for 
variables could change the results in future analyses. The data itself may also be flawed. One of 
the problems with non-democratic countries is the data tends to be unreliable or non-existent, 
leading to accuracy problems. More accurate data may impact which variables have explanatory 
power. Many variables had to be estimated based upon best available proxy. Surely, such actions
altered some of the outcomes. Finally, there may be variables which better translate existing 
theory into a measurable statistic, and as such, would provide more accurate analysis.
Suggestions for Future Research
The findings of my paper suggest two avenues for further research. The first is the 
historical extent of colonizers’ enabling democracy. My analysis suggests the length of time a 
colonizer was involved in a country is not as important as the extent to which a power instituted 
policies enabling citizens to assume leadership roles and become involved in the governmental 
process. If colonial empowerment could be somehow measured, just as linguistic, religious and 
ethnic fragmentation are also measured, great explanatory power may be found, not only for 
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African countries, but possibly for non-African countries, as well. Second, future research could 
be directed toward countries who have instituted consociational agreements, and whether or not 
such agreements contributed to positive outcomes for the countries. Then, countries with similar 
circumstances, but not consociational agreements, might be compared in order to determine 
whether there is a positive democratic benefit to consociationalism in either African or non-
African countries..
Takeaways
Limiting instability appears to be the most important factor in African democratic 
development. An effective way of dealing with instability is limiting the effects of ethnic 
fragmentation, especially in Africa, with its huge amount of ethnic diversity and history of inter-
ethnic conflict. Consociational agreements are one way of limiting the negative effects of such 
fragmentation. Empowerment of minority groups, ensuring each has a representational voice in 
government, helps ethnic groups find common ground. When disparate groups work together, 
political instability and violence are lessened. 
Several factors reaching significance in a world context failed to reach significance in 
Africa. My analysis suggests Africa is a special case for democracy. African countries require a 
different approach from the rest of the world. While political instability events are negatively 
associated with democracy in the rest of the world, the finding that such events are positively 
correlated with democracy in Africa suggests Africans tend to fight for democracy. If one event 
does not result in a favorable outcome, African countries will continue to fight toward 
democracy. Such changes do not happen overnight, but through limiting political instability, 
Africa may reach the threshold for democracy.
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